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Abstract Across Europe schools and other service providers increasingly operate in
networks to provide inclusive education or develop and implement more localized
school-to-school improvement models. As some education systems move towards
more decentralized decision-making where multiple actors have an active role in
steering and governing schools, the tasks and responsibilities of Inspectorates of
Education must also change. This paper reflects on these changes and suggests
‘polycentric’ inspection models that fit such a decentralized context. Examples of
inspection frameworks and methods from Northern Ireland, England and the
Netherlands are provided, as well as a brief discussion of the potential impact of
such ‘polycentric’ models.
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Introduction
Education systems across the world have seen many reforms over the years and
changes in the modalities of governance over time. These developments vary across
countries, but common threads are, according to Au and Ferrare (2015), a shift from
central government towards more decentralised governance, where responsibilities
for governing are increasingly taken up by public-private partnerships, appointed
managers and other bodies comprised of state and corporate leaders instead of by
elected state bodies. The government still has a role in governance, according to
Joseph (2010), but primarily through producing the legislation and regulatory
framework which define ‘a broader configuration of state and key elements in civil
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society’ (p. 5). Theisens et al (2016) similarly talk about a rise of New Public
Governance, which followed an era predominated by New Public Management until
approximately the year 2000. New Public Governance is based on horizontally
organized systems with multiple centres of power which collaborate through
networks. Governments are either actors in these networks, or they steer through
networks by creating the arena in which networks operate, such as through
establishing frameworks for collaboration, or facilitating knowledge exchange.
Systems with many centres of decision-making in which the state is not the sole
locus of authority, but where state and non-state actors are both regulators and
regulated in a set of highly complex and interdependent relations are called
‘polycentric’ (Ostrom et al. 1961; Black 2008), as opposed to monocentric forms of
steering, where the national government is the central actor in defining and
designing civil society and in deciding on how to tackle societal issues through
instructions, norms, policy guidelines, monitoring and control (Teisman 1992). In a
polycentric regime, networks of schools and their stakeholders take a prominent role
in defining, regulating and shaping school quality. Steering through networks is
expected to create conditions for responsiveness which allow and motivate schools
to learn from each other, to find ways to effectively develop and implement
solutions to local problems and to have the capacity to respond to changing
circumstances.
Examples of polycentric systems can be found throughout Europe but here we
will talk about three examples from England, the Netherlands and Northern Ireland.
In these countries we find cases of governments steering through networks (England
and The Netherlands), whereas in West Belfast local government and district
inspectors are active partners in a network of pre-primary, primary and secondary
schools to improve learning outcomes of children in a historically disadvantaged
area.
These moves towards a more polycentric education system have consequences
for Inspectorates of Education. As schools have a role in defining and shaping
educational quality in new local arrangements involving networks of stakeholders,
Inspectorates of Education will be required to adapt their inspection methods. This
will involve a redefinition of roles away from centralized approaches to quality
control, to more agile and contextual methods of evaluation. Such methods of
evaluation are needed as networking can come with a range of problems that
Inspectorates of Education need to address. Common problems have been described
by Mayne and Rieper (2003) and Janssens and Ehren (2016) who talk about a
diffusion of roles and responsibilities with limited clarity for parents or teachers
over where to complain or who to approach when things go wrong, competition
between partners in the network, high transaction costs of collaboration, or
convergence toward groupthink. Examples of these unintended consequences for
school networks were described by Ehren and Perryman (submitted) who talk about
how large Multi-Academy Trusts have introduced multiple layers of management to
coordinate, top slicing schools’ budgets to finance these layers, or where
collaboration between schools located in different parts of the country takes up
substantial time of head teachers to travel to meetings.
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This paper introduces a conceptual framework, describing a continuum of
inspection models which fit a monocentric system of strong centralized steering by
the state (government) to a polycentric system of steering through/within networks
(governance). We will use Christie and Alkin’s (2013) work to inform our
conceptual framework, and compare and contrast the inspection models in the
three aforementioned systems (England, the Netherlands, Northern Ireland) to this
framework, presenting emerging good practices and discussing the constraints and
dilemmas the Inspectorates in these three systems are facing as they move towards
fully polycentric models. First we will describe the types of networks
Inspectorates of Education in our study engage in before we conceptualize
ideal-typical models of inspections in a polycentric context and present examples
from the three systems.
Educational networks
Networks are defined here as formal arrangements of a multitude of public and
private organizations, agencies, and departments that have been constituted to
facilitate collective action (see Provan and Kenis 2008). Informal networks where
schools collaborate without structured agreements on collective action (‘soft
collaboration’) are outside of the scope of this paper.
Collective action can include the implementation of specific education reforms or
services, joint professional development, school improvement and exchange of
good practices and/or peer reviews. These collective actions imply that (aspects of)
the provision and/or improvement of teaching and learning becomes the joint
responsibility of the network, instead of that of single schools. Of course in different
countries the degree of autonomy granted to individual schools or networks varies a
great deal, as do the formal structures underpinning collective actions. Schools
‘have been given decision rights of different extent and in different fields at very
different points in time’ (Altrichter et al. 2014, p. 3). Nonetheless a significant
degree of commonality applies. Typically education networks would include
schools and their governing bodies (within or across different schooling phases),
and potentially also other service providers such as youth services or local
community workers. These networks are often underpinned by legal structures
which formalise the relationships between these institutions. In some cases, a
separate governing body is added to the network to coordinate the partnership work
and provide support services to individual schools, sometimes even taking over
some of the responsibilities and leadership from/of individual schools.
These networks (and their governing bodies) can be the object of inspections
when the Inspectorate of Education evaluates the quality of the collaboration
between partners in the network or outcomes generated by the collaborative efforts
of the network. Such an approach would fit the previously described approach of
steering through networks, where central government sets frameworks, formulates a
vision, facilitates knowledge exchange, or acts as a crowbar to enhance collabo-
ration. In a polycentric system, where governments become actors in the network,
the Inspectorate would however typically also be part of the network and be
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involved in the networking process. In the following sections, we will use Christie
and Alkin’s framework of evaluation theories (2013) to explain the shift in
inspection methodology required, when the network becomes the object of, as well
as the platform for the implementation of evaluations.
Conceptualizing inspections in a polycentric system
Inspections are a widely used form of school evaluation, according to Christie and
Alkin (2013). Their tradition of designing and employing evaluation procedures
whereby teams with presumed expertise, guided by established process standards,
visit a site to observe, account, make a report and judge institutions plays a
significant role in evaluation. Janssens and Dijkstra (2013) previously used Alkin’s
(2013) framework of evaluation theories to position inspections of individual
schools, describing how evaluation theories inform inspection methodology,
inspection judgements and the user focus of the evaluation effort. In this section
their thinking is extended by using Alkin’s framework to reflect on the changes in
inspection methodologies, judgements and user focus when Inspectorates of
Education change their object of evaluation from individual school quality to the
functioning of networks of schools and/or stakeholders.
Methodology
Methodology concerns the techniques used to conduct evaluation studies and these
can range from the traditional research methods of (quasi) experimental research to
evaluate the effects of an intervention or programme, to broader and more
comprehensive conceptualizations of evaluation of human activity, policies or
organizations. Alkin (2013) provides a summary of the main (North American)
theorists that have developed evaluation methodologies, such as Campbell,
Suchman, Boruch, Cook, Cronbach, Rossi, Weiss, Chen, Henry, Mark and Tyler.
His overview of the main ideas of these evaluation theorists suggests a continuum of
approaches from, on the one hand, those which are concerned with
• investigating causal inference and making generalizations to other subjects and
settings,
• evaluating single interventions, programmes, or organisational entities, and
• using objectivist and standardized techniques in the evaluation,
to those which aim to capture
• the mechanisms and conditions that explain the functioning and performance of
an intervention, programme or organisation. Such approaches would,
• include multiple levels of analysis (individual, interpersonal and collective) at
which influence occurs, and
• using constructivist approaches to develop and test theories of ‘how something
works’.
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The first approach typically fits within monocentric systems where Inspectorates
of Education would use standardized frameworks, aiming to produce evaluation
findings that are reproducible and that would lead to similar assessments of school
quality across different inspectors (Janssens and Dijkstra 2013). Such objectivist
and standardized approaches are informed by education policy frameworks that
describe school quality and define the remit of Inspectorates of Education. They rely
to a large extent on available quantitative data, such as students’ test scores or
student drop out rates to evaluate the school’s performance, sometimes using risk-
based approaches which assume a cause and effect relation between risks of failing
school quality (e.g. staff turnover, low teaching quality) and student performance.
Of course inspection even in monocentric environments focusing largely on
individual schools varies hugely from system to system and those with less
emphasis on high stakes accountability and more on development and improvement
fit more comfortably into the second approach above.
By definition a polycentric context implies that the power and control over who
defines and monitors school quality is more fragmented. Interactions about school
quality do not stop at the borders of an individual school but are shaped in
interdependencies of schools and their stakeholders who have different roles and
expertise in defining and improving school quality. The second set of approaches
becomes more relevant for Inspectorates of Education that have to adapt to local
context and the type of networks they are inspecting and to create the conditions in
which such networks effectively steer themselves. The common value of these
approaches is their ability to understand and validate local and context-specific
approaches to shaping educational quality by different partners in a network,
looking at the bigger picture of how the many different parts in a network operate
and the ways they interact and evolve over time in mutually reinforcing ways.
Valuing/judging
Valuing and judging distinguish inspection from other forms of evaluation or
research as inspectors must place value on their findings and often have to make
judgements about the quality of some object, situation or process. Valuing and
judging are an important part of Inspectorates of Education’s work which is often
structured by a set of clear protocols and guidelines to judge the quality of
individual schools. Many inspection systems categorize schools on a four-point
scale (ranging from failing to good), using a hierarchical model of aggregating
judgements on lower level indicators to a summary score on the overall quality of
the school.
These ‘monocentric’ approaches are strongly in line with the objectivist
methodologies described in the previous section, putting the onus on the judgement
of the inspector who is evaluating a school, making ‘pass/fail’ decisions or using
standardized evaluation criteria to compare similar entities, or benchmarking
schools against a set of inspection indicators. Such a standardized ‘objectivist’
approach however does not fit well in a polycentric system where a variety of
different networks emerge which include a range of (sometimes different and
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changing) actors working on a variety of different network-level outcomes in
response to context-specific problems.
Christie and Alkin (2013) describe more ‘subjectivist’ approaches to valuing
which are responsive to the object of evaluation and guided by the meanings people
construct. Stakeholders and users of an evaluation (such as the network that is
inspected) are actively involved in making judgements as the evaluator ensures that
multiple realities are taken into account when making a value judgement. Relevant
methodological approaches as described by Stufflebeam, Wholey, Chelimsky,
Alkin, Patton, Fetterman, Cousins, Preskill, King (see Christie and Alkin 2013)
include the ‘context, input, process and product evaluation model’, Wholey’s four-
stage procedure for sequential purchase of information, ‘utilization-focused
evaluation’, ‘developmental evaluation, ‘empowerment evaluation’ (building on
self-evaluations of users), ‘participatory evaluation’, and ‘interactive evaluation
practice’. The common concepts underlying these approaches are:
• a focus on the process of evaluation and a continuous cycle of evaluation with
the purpose of transformation and learning (instead of seeing evaluation as an
end product to be used for improvement by stakeholders)
• involvement of stakeholders throughout the evaluation process (instead of
treating them as end users), and
• a shift in the role of evaluators from objective outsiders to one which fosters
continuous interaction with the major stakeholders in an evaluation; evaluators
should be actively involved in developing intended users’ commitment to
utilization of ideas for improvement.
Such a shift in the position of schools, their stakeholders and the Inspectorates of
Education who now become equal partners in a more interactive and ongoing
evaluation of education quality also implies a different set of consequences to
motivate improvement. Instead of using sanctions, rewards and interventions in
single schools, Inspectorates of Education now need to develop a set of intelligent
strategies that would enhance the performance of the entire network. This might be
achieved by purposefully providing relevant actors with the information to act on
inspection findings, putting strategies in place to shift the power balance to improve
relations in the network and increasing transparency to external stakeholders. Joint
learning among all participating agencies and organisations in the network and the
Inspectorate through a process of collaborative evaluation and knowledge devel-
opment is the underpinning rationale for user involvement, and reciprocal
relationships and joint activities become essential strategies in the evaluation and
monitoring of schools.
Table 1 summarizes the two ends of the continuum of on the one hand inspection
approaches in a monocentric system, using standardized frameworks to judge
(single) school quality to inspections that fit in a polycentric system, using a more
qualitative, interpretative and flexible approach of validating good practices of
localized and collaborative provision and improvement of education.
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Research methodology
A preliminary scoping exercise indicated that particularly the Netherlands, England
and Northern Ireland have seen recent shifts in education systems towards more
polycentric settings that have had implications for their Inspectorates of Education.
England has recently introduced a number of reforms that aim to create a self-
improving system where schools collaborate in networks to exchange good
practices and maximize inter-school professional development. There are a range of
networks in place, such as teaching school alliances, national and local leaders of
education who support groups of schools in improving, learning networks which are
organized by local authority improvement officers, and other types of collaboration
around peer review and improvement. Here we focus on Multi-Academy Trusts,
which are the most widespread type of (formal) networks of schools. As a recent
NfER report (Worth 2015) explains, Multi-Academy Trusts (MATs) are the
Department of Education’s preferred governance structure for academies and
national policy has seen a number of incentives to motivate schools to become part
of a Trust. MATs are considered to be the best long term formal arrangement for
stronger schools to support the improvement of weaker schools, and the
Table 1 Inspection and evaluation approaches in a monocentric and polycentric education system
Monocentric Polycentric
Methodology
changes: from monocentric
to polycentric:
Who defines standards and
criteria and methods for
evaluation?
What is the object of
evaluation?
Top down, ‘objectivist’ and
standardized approach to
evaluation. Focus on establishing
causality, predicting and
explaining quality, and an
evaluation of single schools
Bottom-up, ‘subjectivist’ approach
to evaluate (schools in) networks,
aimed at validating, interpreting,
understanding quality of context-
specific approaches and solutions
Valuing:
Who decides evaluation
criteria?
What is the object of
evaluation?
Prescriptive assessment criteria to
judge quality of individual
schools, pass-fail judgment
decided by Inspectorate
Inspectorate facilitates evaluation,
goal-free, flexible and specific to
context and information needs of
(network of) schools and
stakeholders
User involvement:
What is the role of
stakeholders in
inspections and use of
inspection findings?
Which phase of the
inspection are they
involved?
Who decides on
consequences of
inspection assessment?
‘Distanced evaluation approaches’
Stakeholders (and schools) are end
users of inspection assessments
and object of evaluation. Only
primary ‘decision-makers’ are
target of consequences (e.g. head
teachers)
‘Collaborative/participatory
evaluation’
Stakeholders and schools involved
in all inspection phases
Intelligent intervention strategies
targeted at all schools/
stakeholders in a network to
improve performance of entire
network
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collaboration of schools, under the authority of a Trust, is thought to improve the
quality of teaching and the richness of children’s learning.
Northern Ireland has also seen a number of reforms aimed at enhancing
collaborative arrangements between communities of schools in a geographical area.
One such example is through the establishment of (voluntary) ‘Area Learning
Communities’ (ALCs) which are clusters of schools who plan collaboratively to
meet the needs of pupils in an area and to focus on sharing good practice. ALCs
work together to provide a broad and balanced curriculum and to deliver on the
statutory requirements of the ‘Entitlement Framework’.1 The Entitlement Frame-
work requires schools to provide pupils with access to a minimum number of
courses at Key Stage 4 (24 courses) and a minimum number of courses at post-16
(27 courses). At present there are 30 ALCs in Northern Ireland (Department of
Education Northern Ireland 2010, p. 4).
In the Netherlands, mainstream schools and special schools are, since 2014,
required to work in partnerships to provide inclusive education for all children (also
children with disabilities) under 76 new authorities for primary education, and 74
for secondary education. These networks were centrally formed by the Ministry of
Education, Culture and Science according to their regional proximity, number of
pupils, existing informal cooperation between schools, and after consultation with
the school boards. Each network of mainstream and special needs schools is now
governed by new education authorities who are responsible for ensuring close
collaboration between these schools in the provision of care and high-quality
education to each pupil. They have a legal ‘duty to care’ which means that they are
formally responsible for finding an adequate school place for each pupil in their
area, instead of parents who used to be responsible for the placement of their child
in a school. The network authority also receives a budget to provide for in-school
support of children with learning/physical disabilities; they are required to develop
an action plan in which they outline how this support is organized and funded within
and across schools in the network. Schools are also governed by a (separate) school
board whose portfolio of schools often does not overlap with the schools in the
network for inclusive education, creating two distinct collaborative arrangements
for schools.
In each of the three systems, Inspectorates of Education inspect a network of
schools and include indicators in their framework on how schools are working
together to support school improvement and/or provide inclusive education to
children with special needs and/or learning disabilities. The systems vary in the
extent to which these methods and frameworks are fully developed and
implemented. The three systems and inspection models are by no means perfect
representations of our conceptual framework, or representative for the types of
inspections of networks across Europe, but they are presented here as illustrations of
our conceptual framework, allowing us to understand potential challenges and
opportunities for other Inspectorates of Education who see their education systems
shift towards a more polycentric structure.
1 Circular 2007/20 The Education (2006 Order) (Commencement No. 2) Order (Northern Ireland) 2007
179 outlines the statutory requirements for schools.
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The study of the three examples presented here included a documentary analysis
and interviews with representatives of inspection agencies (e.g. policymakers/
inspectors) and representatives from the educational network in each country to
describe the shift in roles and responsibilities of their Inspectorates of Education.
The respondents were selected to represent the actors within each country who are
part of/in charge of a school network (using a convenient selection of an exemplary
network) and those who are responsible for the accountability of those networks.
The descriptions present inspection models that were in place in 2014–2015. The
analysis of relevant documents and interviews transcripts was used to provide a
description of the methodology, valuing and user involvement in inspections as
outlined in the previous section.
Table 2 provides an overview of key documents and interviewed participants.
The data was analysed and reported for each country separately, and a summary is
presented in the following section.
Examples of inspections in a polycentric context
This section describes inspection practices in England, the Netherlands and
Northern Ireland that fit our theoretical conceptualization of inspections in a
polycentric context, following Table 1.
England
The formation of Multi-Academy Trusts (MATs) and the creation of a self-
improving system imply a significant shift for England’s Inspectorate of Education,
Ofsted. Their inspections have mostly been predicated on assessing the performance
of individual institutions, and the current inspection framework is still largely
focused on inspections of individual schools. Recent inspection practices have
however seen an increased focus on the evaluation of the support that schools
provide to other schools and the support they receive from their governing body as
an element of the inspection judgement of the quality of leadership in each school.
As a result, schools can now only be judged to be outstanding if they actively
support other schools in their improvement and are an active partner in the network
in which they operate.
The recent establishment of MATs has however also seen the introduction of a
new model of ‘focused inspections’ which looks at the functioning of the Trust and
the collaboration of schools in the Trust. The inspection framework2 and a brief for
inspectors who participate in coordinated inspections explain how such focused
inspections include coordinated visits to all the schools in a Trust. Inspectors who
lead on inspections of individual schools within a focused inspection will look for
differences and common issues between schools in analysing questionnaires from
students, parents and staff during inspection visits (Inspection framework, and HMI
interview). Common issues across schools will be shared and discussed between the
2 http://www.ofsted.gov.uk/resources/framework-for-school-inspection.
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lead inspectors of the individual school inspection teams during the inspection
week(s), particularly to agree on any features that could result in common areas for
further improvement across the Trust. Focused inspections also evaluate the level of
Table 2 Overview of data collection
Education
system
Documents analysed Participants interviewed
England Ofsted strategic plans, inspection
frameworks, consultation documents that
outline proposed changes to inspections,
examples of inspection letters to
academy chains and local education
authorities, the Education Act 2011 and
the Academies Act 2010, and white
papers from national organizations
(ASCL, NAHT) which describe and
suggest (changes in) school inspections
Additionally we read about the legal status
and accountability arrangements of/for
academies and academy chains and the
role of the regional schools
commissioners in monitoring and
supporting academies and academy
chains
Inspection agency:
Two senior HMI
Two senior staff members of Ofsted
(programme director and research lead)
National and a Regional Schools
Commissioner
Educational network representative:
National Leader of Education, who is also
a CEO of a chain of academies
Roundtable session with national
organizations (organized by Association
of School and College Leaders)
Expert meeting (organized by Ofsted) to
discuss changes in the Ofsted framework
The
Netherlands
Inspection framework and the white paper
on risk-based inspections from the
Inspectorate of Education, letters from
the Ministry of Education, Culture and
Science about the new Inclusive
Education Act, the website about
excellent schools, examples of the
support plan and websites of several
networks for inclusive education
Inspection agency:
Coordinator of the Inspectorate of
Education responsible for the
development of inspection frameworks
for networks of inclusive education
Lead inspector of one example network
Educational network representative:
Coordinator of one network for inclusive
education
Chair of the board of one network for
inclusive education
Northern
Ireland
Inspection frameworks and cross-case
analysis of full area and youth
inspections since 2005, the area
inspection report on West-Belfast as well
as the West-Belfast Partnership Board’s
response to the area inspection
Inspection agency:
Lead inspector who carried out the area
inspection of West Belfast
Educational network representative:
Chief executive of the Catholic Council for
Maintained Schools (CCMS)
Education manager for the West Belfast
Partnership board
Education officer of the Belfast Education
Library Board
Two focus group sessions with members of
the West Belfast Area Learning
Community
Nine interviews with school leaders,
principals and deputy principals
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support and challenge individual schools provide each other and receive from the
Trust (HMI interview and Ofsted annual report 2013/2014). There is no common
framework for focused inspections and MAT reviews, as one of the interviewed
HMI explains:
the focused inspections are the inspections of the individual academy that take
place in week one, and they take place in the window in which an academy or
a school is due to be inspected, they can’t come out of that window. So that’s
what the focused inspections are, and they contribute, or form the basis of, the
MAT review along with the phone calls (with head teacher of schools who are
not inspected), so they are a part of the jigsaw, a big part of the jigsaw. The
main part obviously as far as the MAT is concerned, and the other stuff is
really gathering information on performance and the impact of the MAT’s
leadership and governance on the individual academies. There is no
framework for this type of review, although we do have a form of guidance
but it’s not a published framework, but the approach we would use is a
common sense approach.
The focused inspections result in an outcome letter which includes a summary of
strengths and weaknesses of the schools across the Trust, providing an overview of
the judgment of each school in the Trust. Examples of weaknesses in published
outcome letters3 are low standards in specific subject areas across schools in specific
grades, or weaknesses in middle leadership and governance. Strengths may include
the support of individual academies by the Trust, the opportunities for school staff
for secondments and professional development, and the impact of central human
resource services in managing underperforming staff and supporting recruitment
across the schools in the Trust.
These approaches are different to the highly scripted inspection methods of
individual schools; the reason being that Ofsted has no legal remit to inspect Trusts
and is using a specific reference in the inspection framework which allows them ‘to
inspect more frequently schools that are part of a formal grouping of schools who
share important aspects of its provision’ (letter of the Secretary of State, 22 January
2015, pp. 1–24).
The absence of a standardized framework has however, according to interviewed
HMI, led to different conceptualizations of the quality of MATs; one respondent
explained how the Department of Education came up with a list of high performing
Trusts, which were not considered to be of good quality by Ofsted. The practice of
publishing outcome letters instead of standardized inspection reports was also put in
place, according to one HMI, to circumvent the lack of legal power to formerly
inspect the functioning of Trusts. As a result, the focused inspections primarily
evaluate the functioning of the Trust by aggregating the findings from single school
inspections, looking at the collaboration between schools and the support each
3 https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/outcome-letters-from-ofsted-inspections-of-multi-academy-
trusts.
4 https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/397810/Nicky_Morgan_
letter_to_Ofsted.pdf.
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school has received from the Trust, without a clear set of indicators on how to
evaluate network-level outcomes of the Trust and the quality of its centralized
services.
Additionally, the Department of Education now employs (since 2014) Regional
Schools Commissioners who make decisions on applications from schools wanting
to become academies and organisations wanting to sponsor an academy. They are
also responsible for the oversight and monitoring of those academies which are put
in special measures by Ofsted or require improvement.5 The National and Regional
Schools Commissioner we interviewed, explain how, in cases of underperformance
in an academy school or Trust, they take their authority from the funding agreement
(the contract between the Secretary of State and the Trust) to monitor the
performance of an academy and/or its Trust. Monitoring arrangements differ across
regions but generally include Ofsted-like visits, as well as ‘soft intelligence’ which
is informed by conversations of the commissioners and the local authority and
regional head teacher boards.
Northern Ireland
The inspection of area-learning communities are, as with all modes of school
inspection in Northern Ireland, managed by the Education and Training Inspectorate
(ETI).6 Although single school inspections are a priority for the ETI, area
inspections are also used to evaluate a particular aspect of education across different
stages in a geographical area.
The framework for area based inspections is similar to that of inspections of
single schools in that quality indicators, areas for improvement, etc. form part of the
framework. According to an inspector in Brown et al. (2015) ‘the framework in
itself is just like an inspection framework but is more wide-ranging than for a
school’ (p. 40). In the case of the area inspection of West Belfast, the overarching
theme for the area inspection related to: ‘strategic planning for education and
training within the area; the quality of learning for young people within the area;
and the effectiveness of the transition arrangements for young people within and
across the various sectors’ (Education and Training Inspectorate 2010, p. 4). The
network sets specific objectives for each of these topics and these become the
organizing point for the self-evaluation of the network and for each organisation
within the network, as well as for the area inspection by the ETI.
Area inspections include a random sample of education providers in the area who
are visited within a specific time frame. The ETI asks these providers to send in
relevant documents in preparation for the visit, such as student attendance, student
performance in external examinations, and the results of previous inspections. The
ETI also requests that each organisation complete a self-evaluation report on the
strengths and areas in their organisation prior to the inspection taking place.
5 https://www.gov.uk/government/policies/increasing-the-number-of-academies-and-free-schools-to-
create-a-better-and-more-diverse-school-system/supporting-pages/regional-schools-commissioners-rscs.
6 http://www.etini.gov.uk/index/what-we-do/types-of-inspection-amended-2.pdf.
J Educ Change
123
As Brown et al. (2015) explain, during the inspection, each inspector in the team
evaluates a representative sample of education providers relating to their own
specialism, such as pre-school centres, primary schools, post-primary schools,
alternative education providers, special schools, and further education or youth
settings. Data collection (observations, interviews, analysis of examination data,
minutes of meetings) during the visit would typically include a range of
organisations in the area such as the Education and Library Board and the
curriculum advisory support service,7 and stakeholders in these organisations
(students, parents, teachers, members of the middle and senior management team,
and members of Boards of Governors). Self-evaluation reports of each of these
organisations on the topic of the inspection (e.g. transition of students), as well as of
the entire network are an important starting point for the inspection as it will inform
the data collection and analysis during the visit.
When the inspection is complete, each organisation receives its own inspection
report, detailing the quality of educational provision and areas for improvement
relating to the focus of the inspection in their organisation. Additionally, an area-
based report is issued which provides an overall judgement of the collective
performance of the inspection area (ranging from unsatisfactory to outstanding), the
main strengths and areas in need of improvement, and a quantitative description of
the extent to which the objectives of the network have been reached (ranging from
‘almost/nearly’ to ‘very few/a small number’).
There are no formal consequences resulting from an area inspection. Rather,
Brown et al. (2015) describe how area inspections in West Belfast are predicated on
supporting stakeholders in their ongoing improvement through the promotion of
rigorous self-evaluation.
Respondents from the key stakeholder, the ALC, the Inspectorate but also
schools and other providers are overwhelmingly positive about the potential of this
approach to inspection. In brief three key themes emerge in interviews. The first is
that this type of networking enables and improves collaboration and reduces
competition between organisations, facilitating initiatives such as better transition
between primary and secondary schools, shared curricula in key areas of literacy
and numeracy and joint staff training initiatives. The second theme is the extent to
which this type of evaluation has shifted the emphasis in inspection from
accountability to encouraging improvement and in particular to the use of self-
evaluation based on first hand evidence to inform both school and network
activities. The third theme is the way in which a network can facilitate strategic
planning or ‘joined-up thinking’ in a new way but that this process is helped by
external support from both the ALC and the Inspectorate.
The Netherlands
The networks for inclusive education are relatively new in the Netherlands and the
Dutch Inspectorate of Education only recently developed a new framework for the
7 From the 1st of April 2015, the newly established Education Authority took over all of the roles and
responsibilities of the Education and Library Boards in Northern Ireland.
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inspection of these networks.8 The coordinating inspector explains how these
frameworks were developed in close cooperation with school boards and the new
education authorities and includes indicators on:
• Outcomes: the extent to which each school in the network and the network
collaboratively provides adequate support to all pupils and has facilities and
structures in place to provide such support.
• Management and organization: the achievement of the network’s mission and
goals within the requirements set by legislation, the internal communication and
management of the network and the collaboration between schools to achieve
these goals.
• Quality assurance within the network, and its implementation of systematic self-
evaluations to assess strengths and weaknesses and implement improvements.
The framework was implemented in 2015/2016 and follows a risk-based approach,
which is described in the inspection framework for networks of inclusive
education9. A comparison with the framework for primary and secondary school
inspections10 shows the similarity in approaches where an inspection starts with an
early warning analysis of available data to understand potential risks in the
functioning of these networks (e.g. looking at number of students out of school,
transfer of students between schools). High-risk networks are subjected to an
additional expert analysis in which school inspectors analyse the pupil referral and
support policy of the network, the annual report of the network and the distribution
of support services (including special needs teachers) across schools and other
signals of the functioning of (schools in) the network, such as press releases or
complaints from parents or other stakeholders. In case this expert analysis indicates
potential risks of failing, inspectors schedule interviews with the education authority
of the network or its executive manager to discuss risks; a follow-up visit of schools
in the network is issued when necessary.
The coordinating inspector explains how the Inspectorate of Education publishes
the outcome of the risk-analysis (which can be ‘basic’ when the initial desk research
and expert analysis shows no risks), and the report from visits of the network. The
report provides an assessment and overview of strengths and weaknesses on the
inspection framework that education authorities are expected to address. Failing
networks are, according to the coordinating inspector, subjected to increased
inspection monitoring while a regional coordinator can also be appointed to take
over some of the responsibilities of the network authority.
The coordinating inspector and the chair of the board of the network talk about a
number of issues in the implementation of these new types of inspections.
According to both respondents, there is limited alignment between the inspection of
individual schools in the network, and the inspection of the network although both
frameworks have similar indicators of support of children with learning difficulties.
8 Inspectie van het Onderwijs (2013).
9 Inspectie van het Onderwijs (2013).
10 Inspectorate of Education (2010).
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In both types of inspections, schools are judged on the quality of their support to
children. However, inspectors involved in both types of inspections are working in
different divisions within the Inspectorate and have little communication about their
inspections of schools and the network.
The coordinator of the network and the chair of the network board also talk about
a mismatch between their own internal structure and the allocation of inspections.
Both respondents explain how the network, which is comprised of 165 primary
mainstream schools, 6 primary special schools and 9 schools for children with
severe disabilities, was split into three smaller and regionally closer subnetworks to
streamline the support to children. These three small subnetworks are the main
organizing entities for the provision of inclusive education, whereas the Inspectorate
only looks at the functioning of the whole. This mismatch complicates the
preparation for external inspections and the use of inspection findings for
improvement of the network.
Discussion and conclusion
This paper used Christie and Alkin’s framework of evaluation theories (2013) to
provide an overview of methodology, valuing and user involvement that Inspec-
torates of Education can use when moving from a traditional ‘monocentric’ top-
down model of inspection and evaluation to a more lateral ‘polycentric’ one. We
presented three examples of Inspectorates of Education who have developed new
models to inspect networks, and in West Belfast, have become part of the network
they inspect. The variety of approaches illustrates how inspections support
governments in steering through networks or where governments become one of
the actors within a networked education system. In England we described Ofsted’s
focused inspections of Multi-Academy Trusts which evaluates the collaboration
between schools in the Trust and the support from their Trust; in the Netherlands,
we looked at the inspections of networks for inclusive education, whereas our
Northern Ireland case described the area-based inspections in West Belfast.
Single school inspections as the main organizing principle
A comparison of the three cases suggests that these newer ‘polycentric models’ of
inspections are to a large degree informed by single school inspection models that
were already in place in these countries, following existing approaches for
individual schools and using similar ways of collecting data. The Dutch Inspectorate
of Education has for example adapted existing early warning analyses and risk-
based inspections of individual schools to the inspection of the new school
networks. Specific indicators and data within the two (single school, and network)
models are different, but the overall inspection methodology and involvement of,
and reporting to stakeholders is essentially the same. A similar conclusion can be
drawn for England where focused inspections of MATs are primarily an aggregate
of the outcomes of the inspections of single schools (publishing aggregated league
tables to rank order MATs), and only the support of the Trust to individual schools
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captures outcomes on the level of the network. Northern-Ireland is the only example
where inspections of networks seem to move beyond a copy of existing models of
single school inspections. The area-based inspections in Northern-Ireland specif-
ically capture network-level outcomes that are informed by a network-level self-
evaluation that is implemented and quality assured by the network and their district
inspector. The fact that the area-learning communities have a common goal and
need to collaborate when trying to meet legislative requirements of offering a
minimum of 24–27 subject areas may have offered a clear purpose to move beyond
inspections of single schools. However, in Northern Ireland, the area-based
inspections were recently also abolished in favor of single school inspections,
suggesting that single school inspections remain the main organizing principle for
Inspectorates of Education. Our case studies suggest a range of explanations as to
why Inspectorates of Education are constrained in moving towards more polycentric
models and some of the dilemma’s they are facing when trying to redefine existing
practices:
Legislative and political position of inspection systems
The first obstacle seems to lie in the strong legislative positioning of Inspectorates of
Education which limits a more flexible approach in evaluating locally relevant
issues. The underlying argument is that inspections need to be transparent and set in
legislation to allow them to sanction schools. The fact that frameworks, roles and
responsibilities of many inspection systems are prescribed in legislation inhibits the
ability of Inspectorates of Education to adapt to a variety of different contexts,
particularly when there is a climate of high stakes accountability and strong political
scrutiny over who is inspected, on what areas of quality and when. The legislative
positioning of inspection systems also implies that accountability of school
networks primarily takes into account school partnerships that have a formal and
statutory basis where the collaboration and governance of the network of schools is
set out in a formal agreement. Such an agreement and formal basis allows the
Inspectorate to know about existing networks and have a clear line of (hierarchical)
authority and governance to hold the network accountable for its performance.
Inspection systems seems to be limited in evaluating more fluid and informal types
of partnerships that lack a formal authority. Their judicial approach to evaluation
and inspection does however not sit well with the need to develop more flexible
approaches of connecting stakeholders in the system with a focus on understanding
why and how specific solutions work in specific contexts, and how these feed into,
or are shaped by, policy on the national level. Less strict policy frameworks are
needed to create high-quality iterative and evidence-based feedback loops that
would inform system-wide improvement.
Culture of hierarchy and objectivity
Inspection systems are traditionally positioned in hierarchical arrangements where
individual organizations are accountable to national government. Such arrange-
ments include inspections of single schools and other accountability arrangements
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(e.g. high stakes testing) where sanctions and increased monitoring are put in place
for failing schools to improve performance on a centrally defined framework. A
repositioning of inspection systems as a partner within a network of schools
suggests a shift in power balance where schools and inspectors are now equal
partners in defining and evaluating, which does not sit well with the notion of
providing an objective external assessment of school quality on behalf of central
government and for the public good. As Ehren and Perryman (submitted) explain,
Inspectorates of Education generally feel they need to operate as objective outsiders
who evaluate school quality for the purpose of the common good; close
collaboration with their object of evaluation is often seen as a potential source of
bias of the inspection assessment, and standardized and centralized frameworks are
put in place to enhance the accuracy and comparability of the judgement while also
safeguarding schools against personal preferences of individual school inspectors.
A shift towards horizontal and lateral inspection approaches also implies a
greater responsibility of the network to set the agenda for evaluations and have the
skills and commitment to evaluate the quality of the collaboration of schools in the
network, and the contribution of each partner to network-level outcomes. Partners in
the network need to collect information on these newer outcomes and need to
develop indicators showing the aggregate results of emergent collaboration.
In many education systems, data (e.g. on student achievement, drop-out, pupil-
teacher ratio) is organized on the school level and needs to be reorganized to
represent the performance of the network. Additionally, the network also needs to
develop mechanisms to act on such information, e.g. by switching ineffective
transactions between partners in the network, or by excluding partners from the
network who degrade overall outcomes of the network. As Kania and Kramer
(2011) explain, developing shared measurement, and collecting data and measuring
results consistently on a short list of indicators at the network level and across all
participating organizations not only ensures that all efforts remain aligned, it also
enables the participants to hold each other accountable and to learn from each
other’s successes and failures.
Disconnect in accountability arrangements
Our findings also suggest that the introduction of new accountability arrangements
for school networks are to some extent introduced on top of existing systems. In the
Netherlands there are two separate divisions within the Inspectorate responsible for
the single school inspections and inspections of networks who work with two
separate frameworks; they share little knowledge about the schools and networks
they inspect or the reports they write, and there is little coordination of visits and
interventions. In England, the focused inspections and Ofsted’s reviews of MATs,
and the monitoring of academies and MATs by Regional Schools Commissioners is
added to the inspections of single schools. The regions Ofsted works in and those of
the RSCs are not coterminous which complicates the coordination of their work.
Only Northern Ireland sees a clear link between the inspection of individual
organisations and their network through the establishment of a district inspector
who acts as a liaison between the schools and the ETI, and ensures that the
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inspections of single schools and the network are closely connected. Such
connection is needed to prevent a top heavy and multi-layered accountability
system where schools (in networks) are potentially confronted with inconsistent and
conflicting demands and unclear and ambiguous performance targets. As Ehren and
Hatch (2013) have outlined, such systems may have unintended consequences when
schools respond defensively or seek out the most expedient or obviously
acceptable position, preventing them from learning and trying out new solutions.
Looking forward
Finally we ask ourselves whether polycentric inspection models can and should
replace single school inspections. The question is a relevant one, given the value of
single standardized school inspections in ensuring a coherent system where schools
are encouraged to organize teaching and learning along similar standards and
indicators of quality. The contextual nature of ‘polycentric models of inspections’
implies a more fragmented system where information on educational quality is less
easy to compare and with limited opportunities for benchmarking and exchange of
good practices.
The value of an evaluation of networks has however equally been recognized in
the three cases in our study with the effect of adding inspections of networks to
existing single school inspection systems. A question that emerges is whether such a
top heavy accountability system is an efficient use of resources (our West Belfast
case study suggests that it is not), and also if the two types of inspections can
effectively be combined. Our conceptual framework clearly indicated the differ-
ences in approaches and underlying rationale of evaluation approaches in
monocentric versus polycentric systems, particularly in the use of standardized
versus contextualized methodology, the role of stakeholders and the shifting
position of Inspectorates from the top of the hierarchy to being an equal partner in
the evaluation and accountability of networks. The two approaches require a distinct
shift in power balance, and a restructuring of roles and responsibilities of
Inspectorates of Education and schools in a network which seem problematic to
combine. A decentralized inspection model will only truly work in high trust
education systems which have genuinely moved to a more decentralized networked
structure where central government has released control to the local level, when
there are clear structures in place that allow schools to fulfil their autonomy and
when all the partners in a network have the capacity, the expertise and the maturity
to take on this responsibility. Replacing single school inspections with more
laterally organized inspections of networks is therefore only a valid option if the
education system of which they are part has made a similar shift.
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